University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2005

The Uses and Limits of Local Knowledge: A Cautionary Note on
Hayek
Richard A. Epstein

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard A. Epstein, "The Uses and Limits of Local Knowledge: A Cautionary Note on Hayek," 1 New York
University Journal of Law and Liberty 205 (2005).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

NYU JOURNAL OF

LAW & LIBERTY

THE USES AND LIMITS
OF LOCAL KNOWLEDGE:
A CAUTIONARY NOTE ON HAYEK
Richard A. Epstein*
One of Hayek's great intellectual achievements stems from his appreciation
of the quiet virtues of the price system. At a time when everyone was clamoring
for central planning, Hayek, writing in his classic article, The Use of Knowledge in
Society,' understood the unsurpassed ability of the price system to coordinate the
activities of myriads of separate individuals. Each person, in Hayek's view, possesses local knowledge of his own situation, which gives him a clear sense of the
costs of his factor inputs and the prices that he hopes to obtain by selling the outputs of their deployment. The strength of the individual's convictions can be communicated to the world by a single number-the price that is bid or asked for certain commodities. These prices are, of course, not randomly generated but depend
on accurate estimates of both benefits and costs. Yet no market participant has any
incentive to inflate or deflate the relevant figures, because the only person who will
be deceived by this action is himself. The system, moreover, is easily expandable
across different markets, even when their participants operate in different languages and under different cultural norms. The thicker the market, and the greater
the apparent disorder, the fuller the range of options from which everyone may
choose.
The very informational complexity that strengthens a price system simultaneously makes any administrative system of resource allocation balky and ineffective. In that latter setting, parties have the great temptation to tell the tribunal
just what its members want to hear, knowing that an immediate falsification of any
predictions or figures is difficult if not impossible to detect. The upshot is long,
tendentious, and convoluted regulatory proceedings that as often as not assign
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given rights to the parties who make the slickest presentations, not the ones who
have the best uses for the goods and services in question.
In my view, Hayek's case for decentralized planning (which does not mean
no planning) remains unrefuted to this very day. Overall systems of centralized
planning have withered and died, and the dominance of administrative proceedings tends to be confined to certain specialized areas, such as broadcast licenses in
the United States, where the entrenched licensees are able to resist any system conversion. But Hayek has combined his powerful defense of the price system with a
second element that, in retrospect, seems to be incorrect. In dealing with the efficiency of prices, Hayek celebrates the local knowledge that ordinary individuals
can exploit in finding their entrepreneurial niches and in deciding how much to
offer or accept for some commodity. He stresses "how valuable an asset in all
walks of life is knowledge of people, of local conditions, and special circumstances." 2 He provides the example of "the shipper who earns his living from using
otherwise empty or half-filled journeys of tramp-steamers, or the estate agent
whose whole knowledge is almost exclusively one of temporary opportunities, or
the arbitrageurwho gains from local differences of commodity prices." 3 Hayek concludes, "It is a curious fact that this sort of knowledge should today be generally
regarded with a kind of contempt, and that anyone who by such knowledge gains
an advantage over somebody better equipped with theoretical or technical knowl4
edge is thought to have acted almost disreputably."
The implicit undercurrent of Hayek's thought is that the formalist always
loses out to individuals who rely on the intuitive and local knowledge. But it is a
mistake to assert, or even hint, that the devotion to the price system necessarily
means that hunch, intuition, and the rule of thumb are the order of the day. The
root of the difficulty comes from a generalized suspicion of planning. Enterprise
often fails when governments seek to operate large economies, because these governments, no matter how constituted, lack the information to make sensible judgments. That knowledge gap at the center cannot be eliminated by the studied responses of individual firms. But it hardly follows that private parties should fail at
systematic planning in their own activities simply because governments fail in their
efforts to plan a large economy. There is no dominant solution here. Each firm has
the right incentives to decide whether hunch or computer program is the best way
to maximize profits in the long run. The question of which techniques will do better depends in large measure upon their relative costs. In an age when technical
algorithms were difficult to design and apply, the individual who operated under
hunch would be able to outperform the one who operated in accordance with some
preconceived rule. But the balance of advantage can surely shift, and in all likelihood it has shifted with the vast improvement in technology. It is not that the local
knowledge is disreputable. It is that it can become ineffective in at least some

2Id.
at 522.
3 Id.
4Id.
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walks of life relative to more systematic, number-crunching attacks on certain problems.
Here are three brief examples of the basic point. Not long ago, the strongest chess players could routinely thrash the most powerful computers. 5 The intuitive sense of position counted for more than the imperfect computing power of the
earlier machines, which, even then, allowed the machine to review far more positions than the most skillful human. The knack of honing in on vulnerabilities and
opportunities counts significantly in chess. But as the power increased by order of
magnitudes, the balance of advantage necessarily shifted anew. Now the machines
can see further ahead than the individuals, and they can be programmed to make
"intuitive" evaluations of the last positions that they evaluated under some decision tree. 6 How this is done is of no importance, so long as it is understood that the
balance of advantage will shift in only one direction so that the machine will become the master of the man. Local knowledge does not stem the tide.
One may argue in response, however, that this is not a fair advantage in
that there is no dynamic element involved in the game of chess, because all the
elements are open for all to see. It is computational and not judgmental. We do not
have to worry about how others will adapt their behavior in response to the
changes in strategies of individual players. The difference is surely correct, but it
does not negate the key point that increased computer power will help various
traders to figure out the set of strategic responses of other parties.
The point is most telling in the trading of various forms of financial instruments where the seat-of-the-pants traders cannot spot or exploit various arbitrage opportunities with the speed of the best computers. 7 The large spreads that
could be locked in twenty years ago are a relic of the past as ever faster machines
track and thus eliminate these advantages within an instant. 8 The constant power
of markets to return to equilibrium is, of course, a significant long-term advantage
to persons on the outside of the system looking in, because they know that by hiring the right financial agent, they can gain the advantages of an efficient price system. But the intuitionalist that Hayek has praised has been forced to give way to
the utilitarian calculator that Hayek regarded with deep suspicion.
In my view, similar movements are already taking place and will continue
to take place even in other areas in which trades cannot be denominated with precision in dollars, pounds, or euros. One illustration is the way in which athletes are
now evaluated. It is no longer simply a question of watching people play and
forming some judgment about their abilities. It is striking how the general manag5 For a discussion of the developments in the chess contest between humans and computers, see generally Jeffrey Goldsmith, The Last Human Chessmaster,WIRED, Feb. 1995, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/3.02/chess.html.
6See id. (describing the landmark defeat of world chess champion Gary Kasparov by
Deep Blue, IBM's specially programmed computer).
7See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakinan, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 554
(1984). See generally Wendy L. Wall, Stock-Index Traders Expected to Exit Markets This Week in Profit Strategy, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 1984, at 1.
8 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 7; Wall, supra note 7.
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ers of major league baseball teams -Billy Beane of the Oakland Athletics and Theo
Epstein (no relationship, alas) of the Boston Red Sox -do precise mathematical calculations to compare the effectiveness of different athletes. 9 Many of the old measures, such as slugging percentages, tend to give way to more complex measures on
run production that permit a more accurate assessment of capabilities. These formal devices have not displaced simple observation, for the past is never perfect
prologue to the future, but they have altered the way in which athletic teams sign
and coach players.10 I have no doubt that this movement has spread, or will spread
to England, where cricket seems an obvious parallel, and even to a more fluid game
like English (as opposed to American) football.
The point here is a simple one. The case for decentralization depends upon
the abilities of multiple actors to use different strategies to decide how to proceed in
any organized market or competition. But the dominance of decentralization does
not equal the dominance of local knowledge, although in many cases it is consistent
with it. Advances in industrial organization depend on understanding the fit between formal information and particular forms of "know-how." We should acknowledge that the shift from intuition to formal or technical knowledge moves
apace even in markets. We must therefore adjust our appreciation of Hayek to understand that local knowledge has to compete every inch of the way with other
forms of information. Indeed, this is just as it should be, because no one knows a
prioriwhich form of information is superior.

9 See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME (2003) (describing
Billy Beane); Robert Gavin, Sox Owner's Success Driven By Numbers, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 19, 2004, at Al
(describing Theo Epstein and his predecessors).
10See Lewis, supra note 9; Gavin, supra note 9.
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